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6.1  Introduction 
This paper investigates the effects of population aging on saving behavior 
and asset accumulation  in Japan. There are a lot of empirical studies on the 
relationship  between  population  aging  and  household  saving  behavior,  and 
most economists and policymakers believe that aging has and will lower the 
household saving rate to some extent. The precise magnitude is still open to 
question, however. 
I shed light on fluctuations in the national saving rate as a whole, as well as 
in the household and private  saving rates. Reasons for emphasizing  national 
saving are as follows. Japan has a huge trade surplus at the moment, and this 
external balance (or imbalance) is, by the definition of national account, a mir- 
ror image of the internal saving-investment balance. It is obvious that national 
saving has a closer link to the external balance than the savings of individual 
sectors. Moreover, if households view their saving plans through the corporate 
and government veils, so that household saving is not independent from corpo- 
rate and government savings, it makes sense to focus on national saving rather 
than sectoral saving. 
National saving is important not only because it is a source of investment 
and one of the major determinants of macroeconomic growth but also because 
it is closely related to the demand for financial and real assets, and it may well 
affect asset price formation. For instance, how does saving through employer- 
sponsored private pension funds affect the saving behavior of individual sec- 
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tors, the national saving rate, and the demand for various assets? Since private 
pension funds have become major institutional investors, it is extremely im- 
portant to know the potential impacts of  the future decumulation of pension 
funds as population aging proceeds. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 gives an overview of fluctua- 
tions of national saving in Japan, and the relationship between aggregate saving 
rates-either  household or national-and  demographic variables is examined. 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 discuss the effects of population aging on household sav- 
ing rates and corporate and government saving rates, respectively. I try to de- 
compose the System of National Accounts (SNA) basis for national and sec- 
toral savings consistently into saving by age group or cohort, in order to clarify 
who (which age cohort) saves and who dissaves. By examining saving rates 
in  this way,  I hope to clarify the relationship between population  aging and 
fluctuations  of  national  saving.  Section  6.5  focuses  on  saving  through 
employer-sponsored pension plans, with statistical comparisons between Japan 
and the United States. Section 6.6 offers a brief conclusion. 
6.2  Population Aging and National Saving 
6.2.1  Fluctuations of National Saving 
National saving consists of household saving, corporate saving, and govern- 
ment saving. Figure 6.1 shows yearly fluctuations in the national saving rate 
and individual sector saving rates, all defined as ratios to national disposable 
income. The household saving rate, which is the most familiar to us, increased 
gradually in the 1960s and increased rapidly during the first half of the 1970s, 
but since the mid- 1970s it has been declining gradually. 
The national saving rate, on the other hand, increased until around 1970, but 
after rather sharp drops in the first half of the 1970s  it did not fluctuate much 
during the 1970s and the 1980s. The difference between the changing patterns 
of the household saving rate and the national saving rate is, by definition, ex- 
plained by fluctuations in corporate and government saving rates. In particular, 
a sharp increase in the government saving rate more or less offset the decrease 
in the household saving rate in the 1980s. 
6.2.2  Demographic Factors and Saving Rates 
Many theoretical and empirical studies have tried to explain fluctuations in 
the household saving rate, and a number of  possible explanations have been 
identified for the high saving rates up to the mid-1970s and for the recent de- 
clining trend.' Possible explanations of the high saving rates include the bonus 
payment system, unavailability of consumer credit, the low level of social secu- 
1, A comprehensive survey of various explanations for Japan's high household saving rate can 









Fig. 6.1  Japan’s national and sectoral saving rates 
Source; Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounrs (Tokyo: Government Printing Office, various years). 134  Naoto Yamauchi 
rity benefits, the low level of asset accumulation, the high cost of housing, high 
economic growth, and the high ratio of working to total population. The recent 
decline in  the saving rate  can be  explained by  reversals  of  some of  these 
factors. 
Some economists emphasize population aging to explain the recent decline 
of the household saving rate. How do demographic factors affect saving rates? 
Using  conventional  time-series  regression  analysis, Horioka ( 199  1) showed 
that the coefficient of the demographic variable was larger in the national sav- 
ing equation than in the private and household  saving equations. This result 
implies that corporate saving and government saving are more sensitive to pop- 
ulation aging than household saving is. If this is the case, it may be quite mis- 
leading to look at only household  saving when  investigating  the  effects of 
aging on saving behavior.* 
6.3  Household Saving and Asset Accumulation 
According to the  standard life-cycle  model  of  saving, people save when 
young, dissave  after retirement,  and die without wealth.  On the other hand, 
according to the dynasty model of saving, parents and children are linked by 
altruistic motives. As Auerbach, Cai, and Kotlikoff (1991) show, the national 
saving rate is higher for the dynasty (or altruistic family) model than for the 
life-cycle model. Which model is more applicable to Japan? Several eminent 
studies have been published.  Some of them support the life-cycle model, but 
many found evidence that fails to support this model. 
6.3.1  Data of Cohort Saving 
I use the Family Savings Survey (FSS), or Chochiku Doko Chosa, to answer 
this question. There are several statistics in the survey, including saving data 
divided by different age groups. The FSS data set is better than other statistics, 
such as the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), or Kakei Chosa, 
in several ways. First, figures for the saving of self-employed households are 
available in the FSS, but not in the FIES. Second, the FSS saving figures are 
likely to be more accurate because they are calculated from reported assets and 
liabilities rather than from income and expenditure.'  Moreover, FSS data are 
available for every year. 
2. When 1 regressed national and household saving rate equations on the demographic factor, 
the ratio of the elderly to the total population in this case, the estimated coefficients on the elderly 
population ratio were significantly negative when variables that represent asset holding were omit- 
ted. However, when the asset variables were included as explanatory variables, the ratio of the 
elderly population became insignificant. This behavior reflects serious multicollinearity between 
the demographic and asset variables. Therefore,  it is fair to conclude that population aging may 
lower saving rates, but the results of  time-series regression are not robust and  the relationship 
between aging and saving rates may not be straightforward. 
3. The FSS asks respondents about outstanding financial wealth at the end of  the calendar year 
and at the end of  the year before, and about transactions involving houses and land throughout 
the year. 135  Effects of Aging on Japan's Saving and Asset Accumulation 
It is worth noting that the definition of the FSS saving rate is different from 
that of  the SNA saving rate. There are several technical differences, for in- 
stance, the treatment of imputed rent for owner-occupied housing and transfers 
in kind, such as medical services and public education. I would like to point 
out two more factors. First, the FSS saving rate is defined as the net increase 
in the value of assets held divided by annual income. Net increase includes not 
only the acquisition  of  financial and real  assets, but also capital  gains  and 
losses from financial assets (but not real assets) that accrue in a year. The SNA 
saving rate, however, does not include capital gains and losses. We might inter- 
pret the FSS household saving rate as indirectly reflecting the corporate saving 
rate, if corporate saving in the form of retained profits raises the stock prices 
of a company and shareholders'  asset value. 
Second, the SNA saving rate is net of depreciation, whereas the FSS saving 
rate is a gross saving rate in the sense that it includes capital consumption or 
depreciation. Therefore, FSS saving is comparable to SNA gross saving, which 
is the sum of net saving plus depreciation of the household sector. 
Figure 6.2 shows that the amount of aggregate household saving based on 
the FSS gives a good approximation of the amount of SNA gross saving. The 
differences in movement between the two saving rates reflect the difference in 
definitions. The FSS saving rate went up in the first half of the 1970s and in 
the second half of the 1980s. This probably was caused by asset price inflation 





SNA and FSS gross saving rates  Fig. 6.2 
Source:  Author's  calculation  from  Economic  Planning  Agency,  Annual  Report  on  National 
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6.3.2  Saving and Asset Accumulation of the Elderly 
According to the FSS, the saving rate of all households (“all” includes self- 
employed) in 1980-92 period was on average 19.4 percent of annual income. 
This statistic can be broken down by age of household head, The age distribu- 
tion of household saving is shown in table 6.1. The saving rate for households 
with heads aged 65 or older was 16.3 percent, lower than the average, but still 
positive. The saving rates of households with heads aged 60-64  or 55-59  were 
slightly higher than the average. In  the 1970s the saving rate of  households 
with heads aged 65 or older was even higher than the average. 
These facts show that households headed by  the elderly do not dissave or 
decumulate their wealth  substantially. This apparently contradicts the life- 
cycle model of  saving. Do elderly households really continue to accumulate 
wealth? A longitudinal survey is necessary to test this precisely, but such a 
survey is virtually unavailable in Japan. So instead we used published cross- 
sectional age-wealth profiles. The National Survey of Family Income and Ex- 
penditure (NSFIE), or Zenkoku Shohi Jittai Chosa, and the FSS supply tabula- 
tions of this kind. Table 6.2 shows cross-sectional age-wealth profiles in 1992 
from the FSS. It shows that households with older heads tended to be wealthier 
in terms of the current value of financial assets. 
However, table 6.2 does not show time-series or cohort age-wealth profiles. 
I compiled “pseudo”-cohort data on age-wealth profiles by tracking published 
cross-sectional age-wealth data from annual reports of  the FSS. The cohort 
age-wealth profiles show that the Japanese household continues to accumulate 
wealth until at least age 65. For example, figure 6.3 shows how personal wealth 
is accumulated in households where the head was born in 1924. This upward- 
sloping profile may be exaggerated by  the asset price inflation of the second 
half of the 1980s. However, the age-wealth profiles for households with heads 
born in years other than 1924 also show clear upward-sloping curves, and these 
profiles do not include the asset inflation period of the late 1980s. Therefore, 
the pattern of  asset accumulation by  Japanese households is quite different 
from that in the United States. 
As Hayashi, Ando, and Ferris (1988) pointed out, there may be some sample 
Table 6.1  FSS Saving Rates by Age of Household Head (percent) 
Years  Average  -24  25-29  30-34  35-39  40-44  45-49  50-54  55-59  60-64  65+ 
1970-74  25.7  27.4  19.1 
1975-79  22.8  5.8  16.9 
1980-84  17.6  9.7  15.0 
1985-89  19.8  8.4  14.6 
1990-92  21.8  1.9  15.0 
1970-79  24.2  16.6  18.0 
1980-92  19.4  7.4  14.9 
Source: FSS data. 
22.8  26.2 
22.5  23.9 
16.9  18.4 
20.7  21.6 
19.1  19.5 
22.7  25.1 
18.9  19.9 
27.0  24.8  19.9 
23.0  22.1  21.3 
18.1  16.4  16.9 
21.1  17.6  18.4 
22.5  24.1  22.0 
25.0  23.5  20.6 
20.3  18.6  18.6 
30.1  33.3  28.9 
28.9  21.1  24.6 
20.6  18.5  16.2 
22.5  23.3  15.8 
22.0  28.7  17.0 
29.5  27.2  26.8 
21.7  22.7  16.3 Table 6.2  Composition of Household Financial Wealth by Age of Household Head, 1992 
Financial Asset  -24  24-29  30-34  35-39  40-44  45-49  50-54  55-59  60-64  65t  Total 
Total outstanding (1,000 yen)  1,596  4,182 
Demand deposits  19.6 
Time deposits  45.1 
Life Insurance, etc.  26.3 
Corporate equities  0.0 
Bonds  0.0 
Unit and open-end tmst  0.0 
Open-end bond trust  7.1 
Loan trust and money in trust  0.0 










6,739  7,114  10,635  13,841 
Composition (percent) 
7.8  8.4  6.9  6.2 
44.7  41.3  47.3  43.7 
29.6  34.5  30.3  28.5 
5.7  5.8  5.4  9.1 
1.5  1.5  1.4  1.8 
1.9  0.6  1.0  1.8 
1.1  0.8  1.1  1.7 
1.6  2.7  2.8  3.6 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
~ 
14,126  19,146  20,825  23,414  14,654 
6.5  5.8 
42.1  43.2 
30.4  22.9 
8.0  17.8 
2.1  1.1 
1.7  1.4 
0.7  0.9 
4.8  4.2 
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Fig. 6.3  Age-wealth profile for household head born in 1924 
Source: Author’s calculation from the FSS. 
selection biases due to the fact that elderly household heads tend to be wealth- 
ier than the elderly living in extended families. They compared the saving rate 
of the nuclear family with that of the extended family and estimated that the 
elderly  in  extended  families  are likely  to continue  to  save and accumulate 
wealth until around age 80-84.  We expect that similar reasoning is applicable 
to the FSS, but this has not yet been confirmed. Hayashi et al. also found that 
U.S. households  after retirement dissave on average approximately one-third 
of their peak wealth by the time of death. 
6.3.3  Decomposition of Household Saving by Age Cohorts 
The annual  saving of  the household  sector as a whole is the  sum of  the 
savings of all age groups. It is not very difficult to decompose household saving 
by  age group. The annual household saving of each age group multiplied by 
the number of households gives the total saving of each age group. Figure 6.4 
shows the results of  these calculations. For example, in the period  1990-92, 
households headed by the elderly, aged 65 or older, saved 8.9 percent of total 
household savings, whereas households with heads aged 60-64  accounted for 
12.8 percent. 
The share of saving contributed by older households (with household heads 
aged 50 or older) increased gradually in the  1970s and  1980s. On the other 
hand, households with younger household heads (say, up to age 40) have made 139  Effects of Aging on Japan’s Saving and Asset Accumulation 
Fig. 6.4  Decomposition of FSS household saving by age of household head 
smaller and smaller contributions as time goes on. This more or less reflects 
population aging in Japan, or in this case the aging of  household heads. We 
can estimate the exact impact of population aging on the aggregate household 
saving rate from these data. 
6.3.4  Role of Intergenerational Transfers 
The typical  elderly  household  in Japan  continues  to  accumulate  wealth, 
rather than decumulate it as the standard life-cycle theory implies. Thus a huge 
amount of wealth is transferred from parents to children by means of bequests. 
For example,  Barthold  and  Ito (1992) estimated  the  volume  of  transferred 
wealth from published tax statistics and concluded that in Japan at least one- 
third of household wealth is transferred wealth rather than life-cycle wealth. 
The motive for inter vivos transfers may be purely  altruistic or a kind of 
implicit contract between parents and children. If the elderly rarely decumulate 
their wealth, the macroeconomic impact of aging on the household saving rate 
may not be large. 
6.4  Corporate and Government Savings 
6.4.1  Household Saving and National Saving 
There have been a number of studies on the relationship between aging and 
saving rates. Although most previous studies cover only the household saving 
rate, it is also important to investigate how the aging of the population affects 
national saving. A reason behind this is that a household may decide its saving 
rate taking into account the saving rates of firms and the government (see Ha- 140  Naoto Yamauchi 
yashi  1992, e.g.), or in other words, households may  see their saving plans 
through the corporate and government veils. A review of past studies shows 
that, while there is a fairly clear negative correlation between household and 
corporate saving rates, the correlation between household and government sav- 
ing rates is not so clear.4 
6.4.2  Who Claims Corporate Wealth? 
Who has the final right to use corporate wealth, which is the sum of past 
corporate saving? This is, in some sense, the same as the question: Who owns 
the corporate firm? There are several possible answers. 
First, employees may own their corporate savings. This is plausible particu- 
larly in Japan, where the seniority wage profile and severance payment system 
still prevail. If firms, rather than their employees, save, because of the sharply 
rising wage-age profile this corporate saving is just preparation for future wage 
expenditure. This kind of corporate saving represents an increase in the claim 
by  employees on the firm. In this case, the stock price of the firm will not go 
up even if  the firm accumulates wealth since investors know that the wealth 
ultimately belongs to the employees. 
On the other hand, if  corporate saving does not reflect seniority wage pro- 
files, then we  can assume that stockholders ultimately own the incorporated 
enterprises and that they have claims on corporate savings and assets. 
It is not easy to determine which of these conjectures is closest to the real 
world. The real world may in fact be a mixture of these. In this section I assume 
as a first approximation that corporate savings are ultimately owned by  share- 
holders. Corporate equities held by  other firms can be ignored because these 
claims on corporate savings are canceled out by cross-holding of shares. Thus, 
it is reasonable to allocate corporate savings to individual shareholders ac- 
cording to the number of equities held. 
I decomposed aggregate corporate saving for specific years into savings by 
various age groups proportional to the share of  equities held by  households. 
The age distribution of  shareholders is available from the FSS. Figure 6.5 
shows the age distribution of equities and unit and open-end trusts for various 
years. Since the elderly tend to be wealthier in terms of asset holdings and tend 
to have a larger proportion of corporate equities in their portfolios, the holding 
of  corporate equities is highly concentrated among the elderly. For example, 
households with heads aged 65 or older have 33.4 percent of the total value of 
4. I estimated simple household saving rate equations using corporate and government savings 
and household disposable income as explanatory variables. If households decide their saving be- 
havior taking government and corporate savings into account, the signs of the coefficients on cor- 
porate and government savings should be negative. While the coefficients on corporate saving are 
negative as predicted by  the theory, the coefficients on government saving are positive, which 
contradicts the theory. This implies that households see through the corporate veil (at least partly), 
but not through the government veil. 141  Effects of Aging on Japan’s Saving and Asset Accumulation 
Fig. 6.5 
Suurce: Author’s calculation from the FSS. 
Composition of shareholding by age of household head 
stocks. Households aged 55 and older have about 70  percent of the total. Figure 
6.5 also shows that the share of corporate equities held by  households with 
heads aged 65 or older increased drastically from just over 10 percent in 1970 
to approximately one-third in 1992. 
6.4.3  Aging and Government Saving 
Government saving is defined as revenue minus consumption expenditure. 
Thus, the government surplus is defined as government saving minus capital 
formation. 
In the SNA, general government is divided into three subsectors: the central 
government, local government, and the social security funds. Thus, the saving 
of general government is the sum of the savings of the three subsectors. 
Figure 6.6 shows the fluctuations in the saving rates of these  subsectors, 
defined as ratios to national disposable income. The saving rate of the central 
government went negative after 1975, just after the first oil crisis, because of 
the contraction of tax revenue and the failure to cut government expenditure. 
But the deficit became smaller and the saving rate of this sector finally became 
positive in 1987. The saving rate of local government has expanded gradually 
since 1975 and has accounted for nearly 4 percent of  national disposable in- 
come in  recent years. The saving rate of  the social security funds also has 
increased gradually; it reached more than 3 percent in 1991. 
Who contributes to government saving in a specific year? Who dissaves gov- 






































































































































 143  Effects of Aging on Japan’s Saving and Asset Accumulation 
People of  working  age make positive contributions, whereas retired people, 
aged 65 or over, make negative contributions to these savings. 
The tax burden for a specific age cohort can be estimated in a similar way. 
However, it may be difficult to estimate an age-cohort decomposition for gov- 
ernment expenditure. Moreover, it is difficult to decompose future government 
saving by  age cohort because we have to predict future government tax and 
expenditure policies almost perfectly to do so. But we could apply the genera- 
tional accounting method developed by Kotlikoff and others (see, e.g., Kotli- 
koff  1992; Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff  1991). It would be fruitful for 
examining the relationship between population aging and government saving, 
as well as for the evaluation of various policies. 
6.4.4 
Two major components of the social security funds are the public pension 
system and the medical care program. Japan’s public pension system consists 
of several different programs. The balance of the income-expenditure account 
of the social security funds reflects the balances of  all individual programs. 
Currently, the social security funds have a fairly large surplus (positive savings) 
and accumulated wealth. However, we can reasonably predict that savings and 
wealth will decrease and eventually become negative as a result of the rapid 
aging of the population. Quite a few studies estimate in various ways intergen- 
erational redistribution  by means of the public pension  system. The internal 
rates of return of public pensions have been calculated for various age cohorts. 
Takayama et al. (1990) calculated public pension wealth and the amount of 
intergenerational transfers using the microdata set from the NSFIE. 
We can investigate how much population aging and some possible program 
reforms (changes of eligible age, rate of contribution, standard of benefit pay- 
ments, etc.) affect the accounting  balance of  the social security funds. It is 
useful to calculate the positive and negative contributions by age group. It is 
almost certain that population aging will cause a sharp increase in medical care 
costs. In fact, medical care costs for the elderly are much higher than the aver- 
age for all age groups. As for the public pension, we can estimate which age 
cohorts make positive  or negative contributions  to the medical care balance 
sheet. 
Since the saving of the social security funds will eventually be distributed 
to the household  sector at some time in the future, this  saving may have a 
clearer  correlation  with  household  saving  than  does  general  government 
saving.5 
Aging and the Social Security Funds 
5. To test this, I estimated  the household saving rate equations with the saving of the social 
security funds as one of the explanatory variables. The results show that the estimated coefficient 
is not significant, just like the coefficient for government saving as a whole. This implies that 
households do not necessarily take the accumulation of wealth in the social security funds into 
account in deciding their own saving rate. 144  Naoto Yamauchi 
6.5  Saving through Private Pension Plans 
6.5.1  Development of Employer-Sponsored Pension Plans 
In  this  section,  I  explore the  impact  of  the  development of  employer- 
sponsored or occupational pension funds on national saving and capital mar- 
kets. Saving through private pension funds has become more and more im- 
portant in both the United States and Japan. 
In the United States, private pension fund assets amounted to $2.3 trillion at 
the end of  1992. In Japan the one-time severance payment used to be more 
popular than payment in the form of a pension. Occupational pension plans, 
however, have recently become an important instrument of  saving for retire- 
ment. Two  major occupational pension  schemes are tax-qualified pensions 
(TQP), or  the  Tekikaku Nenkin,  and  semipublic employee  pension  funds 
(EPF), or the Kosei Nenkin Kikin. 
The TQP scheme was founded in 1962 to replace the traditional severance 
payment system, whereas the EPF scheme was founded in 1966 to increase 
the standard of  pension payment by  combining employer-sponsored private 
pensions with public employee pensions. In 1992, there were 1,474 EPFs and 
86,766 TQPs, covering 3  1 million employees, or approximately 60 percent of 
all private sector employees. The amount of  accumulated wealth in various 
private pension funds has increased rapidly. The total amount of wealth accu- 
mulated by private pension funds was nearly 50 trillion yen at the end of fiscal 
1992. For both EPFs and TQPs, life insurance companies and trust banks are 
responsible for fund management. Table 6.3 shows this upward trend. 
The  relative  importance of  pension  fund reserves in  household balance 
sheets is much smaller in Japan than in the United States. Table 6.4 shows this. 
In the United States, pension fund reserves were 21.4 percent of total house- 
hold net wealth and 28.3 percent of household financial assets at the end of 
1992. In Japan, outstanding employer-sponsored pension wealth was only 2.2 
percent of net worth and 4.8 percent of financial assets. 
6.5.2  Composition of Pension Wealth 
The asset allocation of  U.S. private pension funds is quite different from 
that of Japanese funds. Approximately 50 percent of the financial assets of U.S. 
pension funds are invested in corporate equities and mutual fund shares (see 
table 6.5). In Japan, approximately 25 percent of  accumulated pension trust 
wealth is in corporate equities. The share of corporate equities increased grad- 
ually beginning in 1971, when the share of equities was only 6 percent. During 
the same time the share of loans decreased drastically, from 79 percent in 1970 
to 14 percent in 1992. 
Asset allocation is restricted by  various regulations. In the case of Japan’s 
pension trusts, risk-free assets (in the sense that the principal should be main- 
tained) should account for 50 percent or more of  total wealth. Moreover, do- 145  Effects of Aging on Japan’s Saving and Asset Accumulation 
Table 6.3  Accumulated Private Pension Wealth in Japan (billion yen and 
percent) 
Employee  Total  Percentage of  Percentage of 
End of  Tax-Qualified  Pension  Pension  Household  Net Yearly  Household 
Fiscal Year  Plans 
I965  19 
1966  43 
1967  78 
1968  I30 
1969  196 
1970  276 
1971  375 
1972  48 1 
1973  613 
1974  808 
1975  1,040 
I976  1,315 
1977  1,633 
1978  2,008 
I979  2,478 
1980  3,052 
1981  3,707 
1982  4,456 
1983  5,277 
I984  6,199 
I985  7,188 
1986  8,257 
1987  9,432 
1988  10,459 
1989  11,859 
1990  13,027 
1991  14,095 
1992  15,027 
Funds  Wealth 
0  19 
2  45 
15  93 
46  176 
100  296 
187  463 
315  690 
486  967 
714  1,327 
1,032  1,841 
1,438  2,478 
1,936  3,251 
2,536  4,168 
3,209  5,217 
3,997  6,475 
5,020  8,073 
6,167  9,874 
7,485  11,941 
8,986  14,264 
10,688  16,887 
12,596  19,784 
14,765  23,023 
17,161  26,593 
19,649  30,109 
22,488  34,347 
25,580  38,607 
28,820  42,915 
32,184  47,213 



















































































Source: Author’s calculation based on SNA and data compiled by the Trust Association. 
mestic corporate equities, foreign assets, and real estate should not exceed 30, 
30, and 20 percent of total wealth, respectively. 
The difference between the positions of U.S. and Japanese pension funds as 
institutional investors in capital markets reflects the difference between pen- 
sion fund portfolios or asset mixes between the two countries. In the United 
States, private pension funds hold 22 percent of their total market value in the 
form of  equities, while in Japan, pension funds hold only  1 percent of their 
market value in that form (see table 6.6). 
The asset composition  of  employee pension  funds is quite different from 
that of households. In the United States, households invested 22.4 percent of 
their net worth in equities (including equity in noncorporate business). and 8.4 
percent  in “credit market instruments” in 1992, while private pension  funds Table 6.4 
Component  1980"  1985'  1990"  1992" 
Household Sector Balance Sheet in the United States and Japan 





Checkable deposits and currency 
Small time and saving deposits 
Money market fund shares 
Large time deposits 
Credit market instruments 
Mutual fund shares 
Corporate equities 
Life insurance reserves 
Pension fund reserves 





Net worth (trillion yen) 
Composition (%) 
Inventory 









Life insurance reserves 




US.  Households 
9,644.3  14,072.3 
100.0  100.0 
34.6  31.2 
14.3  15.9 
66.3  69.8 
2.7  2.7 
11.8  13.0 
0.7  1.5 
1.2  0.5 
5.8  7.3 
0.5  1.5 
11.5  11.5 
2.2  I .8 
9.5  14.2 
19.3  14.6 
0.2  0.2 
0.8  0.9 
115.2  116.9 
15.2  16.9 
Japanese Households 
856  1,237 
100.0  100.0 
1.0  0.7 
16.7  13.8 
57.7  56.1 
54.2  53.7 
39.9  45.2 
1.8  1.6 
3.1  2.7 
21.8  24.0 
3.2  4.1 
4.7  5.3 
4.7  6.5 
0.9  1.6 





































































115.2  115.8  13.6  115.6 
15.2  15.8  13.6  15.6 
Sources: For the United States, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Balance Sheet 
for the CIS.  Economy (Washington, D.C., 1993); for Japan, Economic Planning Agency, Annual 
Report on National Accounts (Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 1994). 
"End of calendar year. 
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Table 6.5  Asset Allocation of Private Pension Funds for the United States and 
Japan (percentage of total) 
Component  1980“  1985a  199W  l991*  1992 
Checkable deposit and currency 
Time deposits 
Money market fund shares 
Mutual fund shares 
Corporate equities 
Credit market instruments 

















0.9  0.5 
5.3  9.5 
0.6  0.9 
1.5  1.8 
47.6  44.5 
32.2  29.  I 
10.8  15.0 
6.9  8.9 
3.9  6.1 
0.0  0.3 
16.5  11.1 
0.8  0.7 
4.2  1.9 
11.9  13.6 
100.0  100.0 
Japan 
0.5  2.3 
37.4  20.3 
51.7  51.2 
9.2  16.0 
0.6  9.5 
0.2  0.6 
100.0  100.0 
0.5  0.7 
7.6  4.8 
1.4  1 .o 
3.0  3.0 
46.9  44.3 
28.6  28.6 
14.5  13.2 
9.8  8.9 
4.6  4.2 
0.2  0.2 
10.3  9.8 
1.7  1.3 
1.9  4.2 
11.9  17.5 
100.0  100.0 
2.1  2.1 
14.1  13.6 
41.3  42.3 
25.9  25.8 
16.0  15.6 
0.6  0.6 
100.0  100.0 
0.7 
4.9 




















Sources: For the United States, Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, Flow of  Funds 
(Washington, D.C., various years); for Japan, data provided by individual trust banks. 
LEnd  of calendar year. 
invested 44.8 percent of their wealth in corporate equities and 28.1 percent in 
credit market instruments (cf. table 6.4 with table 6.5). In Japan, households 
allocated only 4.9 percent of their net worth to equities and 2.9 percent to long- 
term bonds, whereas pension  trusts allocated 25.0 percent  of  their assets to 
corporate equities, 42.2 percent to bonds, and  15.7 percent to foreign bonds 
(again, cf. table 6.4 with table 6.5). In sum, in both the United States and Japan, 
pension funds tend to allocate a larger part of their wealth to relatively long- 
term and risky assets than do households. 
The difference between the asset portfolios of household investors and insti- 
tutional investors such as pension funds may be explained by  several factors. 
For instance, since the portfolio of an institutional investor is much larger than 
that of an individual, the former can allocate more of its wealth to risky assets. 
Economies of scale in investment  may be important as well. Institutional in- 
vestors may not be just intermediaries or agents of households, that is, “reposi- 
tories” of household savings invested in capital markets. 148  Naoto Yamauchi 
Table 6.6  Holdings of Corporate Equities at Market Value in the United States 
and Japan 




Mutual savings banks 
Insurance 
Life insurance companies 
Other insurance companies 
Private pension funds 
Government retirement funds 
Mutual funds 




Commercial and trust banks 
Securities investment trust 
Pension trust 
Life insurance companies 
Other insurance companies 
Insurance 
Other financial institutions 
Nonfinancial business 
Government 








































































































Sources: For the United States, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds 
(Washington, D.C., various years); for Japan, Japan Council on Stock Exchange, Equity Distribu- 
tion Survey (Tokyo, various years). 
a End of calendar year. 
6.5.3  Comparison of Individual Saving and Saving through 
Firm Pension Funds 
Does the development of  retirement saving through private pension funds 
affect individual saving behavior? 
Pension plans are classified into two types: defined-contribution plans and 
defined-benefit plans. In a defined-contribution plan, contributions are deter- 
mined by  a formula agreed to by  employers and employees. In a defined- 
benefit plan, the employee's pension benefit is determined by  a formula that 
takes into account years of  service for the employer and wages or salary. While 
defined-contribution plans are by definition fully funded, in the sense that the 
value of benefits equals that of the assets, defined-benefit plans can be funded 
to any degree (for details, see Bodie and Papke 1992).  In Japan, so far as EPFs 149  Effects of Aging on Japan’s Saving and Asset Accumulation 
and TQPs are concerned, most corporate pension plans are designed to be 
defined-benefit plans, and they must be fully funded in the sense that the dis- 
counted value of benefits is equal to the discounted sum of contributions.6 
A simple life-cycle saving model can be used to explain how and to what 
extent the development of pension plans affects household and national sav- 
ings. As summarized by Munnell and Yohn (1992), it may seem obvious that 
aggregate saving will be unchanged by  the introduction of  pension plans if 
(1) employees and employers correctly perceive the increase in future income 
encompassed by pension promises and reduce wages by an equivalent amount, 
(2)  employees reduce their direct personal saving by  the increased value of 
future pension benefits, and (3) the firm transfers to the pension fund or some 
other firm investment an amount equal to the pension promise. 
However, the real world is more complicated than that, and saving through 
corporate pension funds is not necessarily a perfect substitute for private retire- 
ment saving. Important factors in the real world are favorable tax treatment for 
pension plans and uncertainty about  benefit^.^ 
In the statistical rules of the SNA, saving through EPFs is included in the 
saving of social security funds, which is a subsector of general government, 
while saving through TQPs is included in household saving from the start. Tax- 
free reserves by corporations to prepare for severance payments are classified 
as corporate saving. 
Hence, if severance payments are replaced by EPFs, corporate saving would 
be replaced by government saving, whereas if severance payments are replaced 
by TQPs, corporate saving would be replaced by household saving. 
6.5.4  The Impact of Aging on Capital Markets 
Aging may affect individual saving behavior and asset markets and prices in 
two ways: first, through the change in individual portfolio choice-say  a shift 
from bonds to equities as one grows older-and,  second, through the behavior 
of employer-sponsored pension funds. In this section let us examine the latter. 
A large fraction of financial assets in the United States is held by employer- 
sponsored pension funds, as we have already seen. These assets will be sold to 
finance pension benefits sometime in the future. When the number of  retired 
elderly becomes larger than the number of employees, sales of assets by these 
funds will be large relative to purchases (saving to fund the future benefits of 
6. However, a substantial number of EPFs and TQPs have failed to accumulate enough funds to 
meet future payments in these years because of historically low interest and weak asset market 
indices. Therefore, it is suggested that  some defined-benefit pension plans be reorganized into 
defined-contribution plans. 
7. How strong is the link between pension fund accumulation and household direct saving? To 
clarify this, I estimated a household saving equation using saving through corporate pension funds 
(defined as net  yearly  increase of managed assets) as an  explanatory variable. The estimation 
results show that the coefficients on saving through corporate pension funds are statistically sig- 
nificant, and the values of these coefficients are much higher than unity. This implies that typical 
households see corporate pension programs as good substitutes for individual retirement saving. 150  Naoto Yamauchi 
current workers). Thus, the tendency will be for the price of assets to fall. This 
change in the market for financial assets could have a substantial effect on the 
accumulated wealth of the elderly. 
The effects may differ between Japan and the United States. The negative 
impact on the capital market may be much smaller in Japan than in the United 
States. The reasons are as follows: First, in Japan the elderly tend to continue 
to save, or at least not dissave much, as discussed earlier. Second, it is highly 
likely that a substantial part of individual retirement saving will be replaced by 
compulsory  or semicompulsory  saving through employer-sponsored pension 
plans, which have a larger demand for corporate equities and long-term bonds. 
In the transitional period, the selling pressure on equities may be offset by the 
potential demand for them. Third, in Japan, the regulation of the asset composi- 
tion of pension funds has been quite restrictive, but the possible deregulation 
of asset composition would encourage demand for corporate equities. While it 
is difficult to estimate the possible effect of  such deregulation on investment, 
the present asset mix of US. pension funds gives us a good hint. As we have 
already seen, U.S. pension funds allocate approximately half of their assets to 
corporate equities. There must be a fair amount of room for Japanese pension 
funds to increase the share of equities in their portfolios. 
6.6  Conclusions 
One of the purposes of this paper was to find some statistical evidence about 
the effects of population  aging on national saving, corporate pension funds, 
and asset accumulation.  I have examined these, using the System of National 
Accounts, Flow of Funds, and Family Savings Survey in Japan and the United 
States. The main findings of the empirical investigations are as follows. 
First, microdata  on household  saving and wealth by age do not show that 
the  elderly dissave or decumulate their assets drastically in Japan. If this is 
really the case, aggregate household and national saving rates are not likely to 
decline sharply in the near future. 
Second, indirect saving through employer-sponsored pension plans is gradu- 
ally replacing  a portion  of individual  direct  saving in Japan, just as in  the 
United  States. Increasing pension fund wealth tends to lower the household 
saving rate, but it is not clear whether the growing popularity  of  corporate 
pensions lowers the national saving rate. 
Third, the demand for corporate equities will increase rather than decrease 
as long as corporate pension funds cover more and more employees and have 
a positive attitude toward investment in equities, supported by deregulation of 
investment. Therefore, in Japan, it is unlikely that the negative impact of  aging 
on the capital market will be serious. 
While I have emphasized the interrelationship  of  saving behavior among 
individual  subsectors, I have not conducted  exact statistical tests about this 
interdependence, apart from some preliminary time-series regression analysis. 151  Efrects of Aging on Japan’s Saving and Asset Accumulation 
Among the subsectors reviewed in this paper, the quantitative impact of aging 
on the saving behavior of  the government sector is not yet clear. We have to 
develop some sort of simulation model to evaIuate effects of aging on the gov- 
ernment sector. Every topic listed here is of  particular interest to us but is left 
for future work. 
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